Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 2

2007

The Myth of Inherent and Inevitable Industry
Differences: Diversity as Artifact in the Quest for
Patent Reforms
Robert A. Armitage
Eli Lilly and Company

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert A. Armitage, The Myth of Inherent and Inevitable Industry Differences: Diversity as Artifact in the Quest for Patent Reforms, 13
Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 401 (2007).
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr/vol13/iss2/3

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE MYTH OF INHERENT AND INEVITABLE
"INDUSTRY DIFFERENCES": "DIVERSITY"
AS ARTIFACT IN THE QUEST
FOR PATENT REFORMS
RobertA. Armitage*
Cite as: Robert A. Armitage, The Myth of Inherent and Inevitable
"Industry Differences": "Diversity" as Artifact in
the Questfor Patent Reforms
13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 401 (2007),
available at http://www.mttlr.org/volthirteen/armitage.pdf
INTRODU CTION ......................................................................................

I. No

FACTORS FOR JUDGING THE SUCCESS OR
FAILURE OF A PATENT SYSTEM ................................................

II.

40 1

INDUSTRY DIFFERENCES EXIST ON CRITICAL

404

"INDUSTRY DIFFERENCES" WILL MANIFEST THEMSELVES
IN A FAILING PATENT SYSTEM BECAUSE FAILURE
DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACTS TECHNOLOGY

III.

SECTORS RELATIVELY NEW TO PATENTING ............................
QUESTIONABLE PATENTS HAVE DIFFERENTIAL NEGATIVE

407

IMPACTS ON INDUSTRY SECTORS LESS DEPENDENT
IV.

UPON PATENTS AS A DRIVER OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION ... 412
THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF "BAD APPLE" PATENTS
HAS RESULTED IN A MISGUIDED FOCUS ON DISABLING
PATENT REMEDIES IN THE NAME OF PATENT REFORM ........... 415

V.

CASTING ASIDE THE "DIVERSITY MYTH" OPENS THE
WAY TO DEFINING THE COMMON AGENDA
FOR PATENT REFORM THAT JUSTIFIES PRESERVATION

OF A UNITARY PATENT SYSTEM ...............................................
C ONCLU SION .........................................................................................

416

4 19

INTRODUCTION

The University of Michigan Law School hosted a two-day conference entitled "Patents and Diversity in Innovation."' The morning of the
*
Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Eli Lilly and Company, Indianapolis,
Indiana 46285. The author was a partner with Vinson & Elkins LLP and led the intellectual
property practice in its Washington, D.C. office before joining Eli Lilly and Company in 1999
as Vice President and General Patent Counsel.
1.
Patents and Diversity in Innovation, http://students.law.umich.edu/mttlr/
patentsanddiversity/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
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first day featured a panel devoted to "industry differences." This panel
took up the task of dealing with the following questions:
How has diversification of innovation and the expansion of
patentable subject matter affected patent practice? How do
markets for technology vary from sector to sector? And how do
they reflect or influence patent practice? To what extent are
business practices and competitive markets shaped by the nature
of the technology, product, or service?2
The panel on "industry differences" was designed to provide a critical predicate for this two-day enterprise. The panel was needed to
validate the conference's implicit premise that the patent system works
differently in different industries, thereby affording credibility to the
contention that a future patent system might take account of "industry
differences" more broadly and comprehensively.
The conference's subsequent discourse was then set to address
how-industry sector by industry sector-differing requirements for
patentability, differing protocols for patent examinations, differing remedies for patent infringement, and differing competition law principles
applicable to the exercise of these exclusivity rights would become part
of the laws for patenting inventions. This intent to devise parameters for
a "post-unitary patent system" was cogently captured on the same web
page in the following question: "At what level and how would a 'postunitary' patent system differentiate among economic characteristics and
conditions?"3
A conference titled "Patents and Diversity" did not need to be premised on an unproven contention that consequential industry differences
do exist. It could have set out to question the existence and significance
of industry differences, and, had they been found, it could have focused
on their etiology.
If the conference had focused on the latter, one of the core questions
for examination could have been: Are the differences that manifest themselves among industries truly inherent or inevitable differences, driven
by disparities between technology sectors, which should lead policy
makers to a post-unitary patent system, or, alternatively, are such differences simply artifacts to be disregarded in deciding the future contours
of a unitary patent system? The conference could have examined
whether or not differences between industry sectors are derivative

2.
Patents and Diversity in Innovation, Issues, http://students.law.umich.edu/mttlr/
patentsanddiversity/issues.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
3.
Id.
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instead of inherent. A penetrating analysis might afford no support whatsoever for fostering the creation of the "post-unitary" patent system.
More specifically, the conference might have zeroed-in on a causeand-effect analysis. It could have debated and considered the following
questions:
•

Is the notion that inherent or inevitable "industry differences"
exist between technology sectors just plain wrong?

*

If so, does the absence of significant inherent differences
among industry sectors destroy any possible justification for
creating a "post-unitary" patent system crafted to somehow
"differentiate among economic characteristics and conditions"?

*

Alternatively, are the apparent "industry differences" attributable to a patent system in need of a set of unitary, qualityrelated reforms (most particularly reforms that would apply
commonly across industry sectors)?

*

If such an agenda of unitary reforms was successfully enacted,
would the apparent "industry differences" be substantially
eliminated?

A strong case can be made that the conference ran topsy-turvy. The
conference avoided serious consideration of the contention that "industry
differences" are the effect of a patent system in need of a set of unitary
reforms, rather than the cause for defining an agenda of non-unitary
changes to the patent laws calculated to produce a post-unitary patent
system. In other words, had the effect not been treated as the cause, the
conference would have concluded that "industry differences" should not
drive patent reforms but are simply an artifact of a unitary patent system
in need of substantial and unitary reforms.
Thus, by looking at "industry differences" as a cause (i.e., the jumping-off point for a pell-mell rush to disunity in the patent laws) and not
an effect (i.e., the result of a patent system sorely in need of qualityfocused, but unitary, reforms), the conference neglected what should
have been a decisive, predicate debate; a debate that might have mooted
much of the remainder of the conference.
The conference might have picked as a jumping-off point the work of
the National Research Council of the National Academies on patent law
reform. In 2004 the National Academies published a report that was the
product of both sponsored research and over four years of deliberations by
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academics, economists, and patent professionals. It contained a set of recommendations for unitary changes to the patent laws that were sweeping
in their scope: adopt "harmonizing changes" (the first-inventor-to-file
principle and elimination of the "best mode" requirement), eliminate
"subjective elements" from patent litigation (the "willfulness" doctrine,
the unenforceability defense based upon "inequitable conduct," and the
"best mode" requirement), and institute an "open review" procedure in
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for eliminating mistakenly issued patents A core recommendation of the National Academies'
work was that a unitary patent system should be preserved through enactment of this set of unitary patent law reforms,6 largely directed to
patent quality improvements and greater civil justice for patent litigants.
In the last Congress, both the House and Senate saw legislation introduced that was principally directed to these initiatives Presuming the
National Academies' recommended reforms in these two bills were to
become law, what would become of "industry differences"? Would a
conference devoted to "patents and diversity" still be necessary to lead
the charge for a "post-unitary" patent system?
This Article offers the analysis on "patents and diversity" that might
have been-had the conference challenged, rather than swallowed, its
premise.
I. No INDUSTRY DIFFERENCES EXIST ON CRITICAL FACTORS FOR
JUDGING THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF A PATENT SYSTEM

The first clue that a post-unitary patent system might not be needed
as a response to inherent and inevitable "industry differences" is the absence of an industry difference when defining the critical factors for
judging the success or failure of a patent system. If patent systems succeed or fail for the same set of reasons, regardless of industry sector, it
becomes vastly more complicated, analytically, to posit the need for a
"post-unitary" patent system.
A poll across all industry groups to identify the factors needed for a
successful patent system would produce a consonant set of answers.
There is one cross-industry "hymnal" from which virtually all IP manag-

4.

COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., The National Academies Press 2004), available at http://books.nap.edu/html/patentsystern/0309089107.pdf.
5.
Id. at 81-129.
NAT'L RESEARCH

21ST CENTURY,

6.

Id.

7.

See S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
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ers sing in complete harmony. Regardless of industry sector, a patent
system succeeds through:
"

rigorous application of patentability rules that constrain what
patents may issue and how broadly they can claim inventions;

"

consistent application of those rules;

"

patenting principles that lend themselves to highly predictable
outcomes in the patent office and the courts;

"

prompt examination of all of an inventor's claims to an invention;

"

exclusive use of objective requirements for patentability that
are straightforward in their application;
patentability assessments that depend solely on publicly accessible information; and

"
•

certainty in the enforcement of valid patent rights. 8

Factors fostering failure are the negative mold for the success factors:
patentability rules that are not well developed nor well understood as they apply to various types of technologies,
especially those relatively new to patenting;
patentability rules that are not consistently applied in the patent office;
•

enforcement of valid patent rights is unduly expensive and
difficult;
challenges to the validity of questionable patents are arduous,
expensive, and time-consuming; and
patentability determinations that are unpredictable, creating
prolonged uncertainty over the scope of protection, with undue dependency upon non-public information and subjective
factors.

What is the hallmark of a "successful" patent system under these
unitary criteria? The most commonly articulated trait of such a system is
that a person with an understanding of patent law and skilled in the
technology of a patented invention would be able to pick up a patent,
reference only publicly accessible information, and make a prompt,
8.

See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS.,

supra note 4, at 2-5.

406

Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review

[Vol. 13:401

certain, andfinal determination of the patent's validity and the scope of
protection afforded.9

The only significant criticism of these success factors (and their flipside failure factors) is that they may not capture everything needed for
success or failure of a patent system. However, even if these factors are
only exemplary, adding more such factors would do nothing more than
broaden the consensus. The theme is common-the recipe for success is
to take out unpredictability, uncertainty, excessive costs, and prolonged
delays in establishing and resolving the scope of valid rights.
There is abundant evidence for the concurrence across industry sectors on these success and failure factors. The most significant evidence is
the existence of two major industry coalitions that have emerged during
the past two years-the Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform and
the Coalition for Patent Fairness. Both coalitions have supported patent
reform legislation containing a host of common elements, largely tied to
patent quality and civil justice issues.1° Between the two coalitions, approximately 100 companies are represented."
While the two coalitions have differences in the reform proposals
that they are advocating, the overlap between the initiatives each supports is far more substantial. At their core, both want more public
involvement in the patenting process-both before and after patent issues.' 2 Both complain about the "subjective
elements" in patent litigation
3
and seek to cut back on their reach.'
Given this unitary view on which elements make a successful patent
system and which do not-and the significant agreement across industry
sectors on what reforms ought to be enacted in the new Congress-a pair
of questions present themselves:
Are some of the apparent "industry differences" the result of
key failures (or insufficient success) of the existing patent
system, which produce burdens that fall disproportionately on
industry sectors relatively new to patenting?

9.
Transcript of The National Academies' Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy, American Intellectual Property Law Association & The Federal Trade
Commission Town Meeting on Patent Reform, San Jose, California Meeting (Feb. 18, 2005),
http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Meetings-and-Events l/Roadshows/20058Town
MeetingSanJoseTranscript.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2007).
10.
See Letter from the Coalition for Patent Reform to The Honorable Lamar S. Smith,
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property (Sept. 1,
2005), available at http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/LegislativeAction/109th_
Congress/House 1/Coalletter.pdf; Coalition for Patent Fairness, http://www.patentfairness.org.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Do the remaining "industry differences" manifest themselves
because of the greater tolerance for patent system failures in
industry sectors that rely on patents to sustain market capitalizations?
These two questions will be examined in the sections that follow.
The importance of these questions should be apparent. If the reforms
envisioned by the National Academies effectively address the failures of
the patent system, they also address the root causes for the manifestation
of industry differences. In a patent system that truly succeeds under the
consensus factors of success, the "industry differences," which are a result of the differential impact of failure factors and differential tolerance
for such failures in different industries, largely disappear.
II.

"INDUSTRY DIFFERENCES" WILL MANIFEST THEMSELVES
IN A FAILING PATENT SYSTEM BECAUSE FAILURE
DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACTS TECHNOLOGY SECTORS

RELATIVELY NEW TO PATENTING

Patenting principles can be difficult to apply in any technology sector because their application requires the deconstruction of something
tangible and physical into something abstract and linguistic. Application
of patentability principles to an invention depends upon both an understanding of the invention and of the existing technology from which the
invention arises. It requires the invocation of language that can definitively characterize the invention and distinguish it from all pre-existing
technology. Of equal importance, inventors must articulate the line between the new technology that is their individual creation and any future
technology for which the inventor does not yet possess a complete conception or cannot otherwise describe its practical implementation.
In an industry sector that is relatively new to patenting, all the complications of getting a patent system to work efficiently and effectively
become magnified. This is due to the difficulty of designing effective
patenting strategies when the application of patent law to that new technology sector is unpredictable. Patent law is inevitably unpredictable
without a substantial body of legal precedent. Moreover, the scant precedent may shift to and fro before settling down as a consistent body of
law.
This unpredictability affects even the most basic concepts in patenting. This was certainly true for biotechnology in the 1970's and
1980's on the full panoply of patenting issues: utility, written description, enablement, definiteness, subject matter eligibility for patenting
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and non-obviousness. It is today no-less a truth in the information
technology (IT) sector.
As an example of the current confusion that exists in the IT sector,
even on the most basic of patenting principles the Supreme Court is deciding this term a case that may turn on whether computer software code
by itself can qualify as "a component of a patented invention."' 4 The
Federal Circuit has held that it can because software code itself is patent
eligible subject matter and, therefore, can certainly be a component of a
patented invention. 5
However, is software code alone something that meets the subject
matter eligibility requires for patenting? Software code, or so-called "object code," is a sequence of binary values that is commonly represented
as a series of zeros and ones. Its alter ego is so-called "source code" that
is written in a human-intelligible computer programming language.
Thus, what the "object code" encodes is a set of instructions (information) that can be recognized by a digital computing machine. Through
the computing machine's recognition of the object code, the computing
machine's function is directed.
Software, whether machine-recognized "object code" or humanintelligible "source code," is, in and of itself, simply information. It is
instructions or directions, which have never been eligible for patents.
Information itself
is not a "process, machine, manufacture, or composi6
matter."'
of
tion
After 216 years of patent jurisprudence on what is patent-eligible
subject matter, how is it possible that any confusion could exist on the
simple question of whether "information," in the form of software code
or otherwise, is a patent-eligible product or process? The unfortunate
reality is that the Federal Circuit has not yet addressed this issue with
sufficient analytical depth as it relates to software code standing alone, in
part because it has decided too few cases on the topic. The same is true
for the application of other important principles of patent law as applied
to computing machines: what type of "written description" is needed,
how detailed must the enabling disclosure be and what prior art is
enough to deny a patent for "obviousness?"
Because the case law on patenting in individual technology sectors
has historically been slow to develop, it can take decades to see how
these standards will be applied to a new technology. Normally, this
precedent develops as patent examiners reject patent claims for new
14.
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 127 S.Ct. 467 (2006).
15.
See Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("Without question, software code alone qualifies as an invention eligible for patenting.").
16.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
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technologies and the administrative patent judges (APJ) in the USPTO
rule on appeals from those rejections. This by itself is a slow process,
particularly where the Office is slow to examine and decide substantial
numbers of patent appeals.' 7 These rulings by the USPTO are then appealed to the Federal Circuit.
Thus, the nuanced understanding of the patentability rules as they
apply to biotechnology, software, business methods, nanotechnology, or
any other new technology requires a large number of patent examiner
rejections, APJ decisions, and ex parte appeals to the Federal Circuit. It
is an arduous process, with no catalyst for urgency to get the law, as it
applies to a new technology, clarified promptly.
The likelihood of a patent examiner mistakenly issuing an invalid
patent is high during the early stages of this process. Indeed, substantial
numbers of invalid patents may be issued as inventors overreach in their
patent claims. For example, when gene patents first began to be issued as
the biotechnology industry grew, inventors sought expansive patent
claims reaching well beyond any credible claim to invention.
A classic example of overreaching in an emerging area of patenting
was University of California's patent claiming all vertebrate insulin
genes.'8 Its claim was based upon its success at sequencing the rat insulin
gene, but it offered no new insight into any of the insulin genes in other
vertebrates.' 9 The University of California also laid claim to the human
insulin gene, 2° again notwithstanding that it offered nothing new about
the human gene's actual structure or how it might be isolated and put to
a practical use. The Federal Circuit upheld the lower court's invalidation
of these claims of the patent. 2' This decision, issued twenty years after
the initial patent application was filed, demonstrates just how long the
process for determining how the patentability rules can be.
In a more established technology sector, one in which the patentability rules have been thoroughly explored, the patenting story will be quite
different: most of the issued patents more likely will be upheld in subsequent enforcement litigation, either as being entirely valid or mostly so.
In a technology sector relatively new to patenting, issued patents will be
of much less certain validity-and the probability is much higher that
many such patents will be partially or entirely invalid. The "industry

See Summary of Patent Examining Activities, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/
17.
offices/comannualI2006/50301_table l.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) (detailing the number
of applications filed versus the number of applications disposed of by the Patent Office).
U.S. Patent No. 4,652,525 (filed Jun. 28, 1983) [hereinafter '525 Patent].
18.
19.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 E3d 1559, 1567-69 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
20.
'525 Patent.
Eli Lilly & Co., 119 E3d 1559.
21.
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differences" created by this disparity between mature technologies and
those new to patenting can be quite remarkable.
The view of a company in a patent-mature industry sector, which
faces a bushel basketful of entirely valid patents relevant to a technology,
would not be seriously jaundiced by a rotten apple or two in the bushel
basket. On the other hand, a company in an industry sector relatively
new to patenting, faced with a bushel basket of relevant patents that are
mostly rotten, would have an entirely different and negative view on the
practical and commercial obstacles that the patent system presented to
placing a new product on the market. While such a disparity in patent
quality produces clear-cut industry-sector differences, such differences
are not inherent to the technology itself-or even inherent in the strategies the companies in the industry sector might use for patenting
inventions.
Thus, before concluding that inherent "industry differences" dictate
embarking on a "post-unitary" patent system, it is essential to look at the
inevitability of the "bad apple" issue. If it appears that some industry
sectors face only a few bad apples, while others face bad apples by the
bushel, the resulting "industry differences" do not justify seeking a
"post-unitary" patent system. Instead, they cry out for promptness in the
elimination of the disparity in the relative and absolute numbers of bad
apples.
The "bad apple" issue, however, has dimensions other than those
that arise from differing levels of sophistication of the patent system towards a technology. Even if all industry sectors faced identical levels of
"bad apple" patents, the sheer number of "bad apples" differs de facto
among industry groups because of differing patenting strategies. Some
industry sectors patent more intensively than others, making the absolute
numbers of patents within each industry sector differ significantly.
Looking at the statistics compiled by the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) on the top companies granted new patents in
2005,22 it appears that if "bad apples" appeared at a constant rate across

technologies, the absolute number of "bad apple" patents would be an
order of magnitude greater for the IT sector than the pharmabiotechnology sector. The following table shows this disparity quite
graphically:23

22.
Intellectual Property Owners Association, Top 300 Organizations Granted U.S.
Patents in 2005 (Jun. 2, 2006), http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Top-300PatentOwners.
23.
Id.
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Pharma-Biotechnology

Sector-Patents

Sector-Patents

IBM-2941
Hewlett-Packard-1808
Micron-1561
Intel-1549
Microsoft-750
Texas Instruments-734
Sun Microsystems--715

411

Pfizer--389
Johnson & Johnson-379
Bayer-1 76
Sanofi-Aventis--145
Bristol-Myers Squibb-1 13
Merck-il00
Glaxo SmithKline-94

One major pharmaceutical company, Eli Lilly and Company, came
in at the very bottom of the listing. With 48 patents issued to it in 2005,
it ranked 299th. In terms of Research & Development budgets, a close
comparator,24 Cisco Technology, Inc., ranked 38th with 440 patents.
It is fair to conclude that the number of "bad apple" patents that a
typical IT-industry enterprise might face is an order of magnitude higher
than in the pharma-biotechnology sector, even if the maturity of the
technology was ignored. Combined with the greater maturity of pharmaceutical patenting compared to IT patenting,25 the number of "bad apple"
patents in the IT sector is likely much greater in both absolute and relative terms.
Other, more subjective factors may also drive this differential even
higher. While the sheer number of patents generated among the IT industries is huge, another "patent quality" driver is the attention given to
individual patents during the drafting and application process. Because
of the need for quality patents that can survive aggressive challenges by
generic drug companies, the pharmaceutical industry must typically focus on patenting strategies that produce a relatively small number of
patents, with each individual patent bathed in attention. Conversely, IT
companies have adopted mass patenting strategies designed to produce
huge numbers of patents that must be procured using low-cost approaches to drafting and examining. As a result, it is likely that the
difference in the number of patents further understates the actual differential in "bad apples."
Thus, when looking at the issue of "bad apple" patents, it appears
that the differences are not so much in inherent industry differences as in
24.
Compare Eli Lilly & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8, available at http://
www.shareholder.comcommon/edgar/59478/950137-06-2395/06-0O.pdf, and Cisco Systems,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Sept. 18, 2006), available at http://investor.cisco.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=81192&p=irol-sec.
25.
Maturity here is based upon the number of reported appellate court decisions interpreting basic patentability requirements in the two sectors.
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maturity and strategy differences. The IT industry sector has adopted
strategies that result in more patents, but less assurance that any individual patent will be a valid patent. These strategies operate in a technology
sector that has been less fully developed in terms of the application of
the patentability rules to the technology.
The "industry differences" that arise from the differential presence
of "bad apple" patents would, of course, disappear if the "bad apples"
themselves could be efficiently ejected from the patent system. The
National Academies' recommendations would appear to go the heart of
redressing the "bad apples" issue as a source of apparent "industry
differences." By aggressively increasing the public involvement in the
patenting process, especially the "open review" procedure that could
quickly and inexpensively eliminate mistakenly issued patents, the
disparities in patenting strategies would likely lessen dramatically across
industry sectors.

III. QUESTIONABLE PATENTS HAVE DIFFERENTIAL
NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON INDUSTRY SECTORS LESS
DEPENDENT UPON PATENTS AS A DRIVER OF
MARKET CAPITALIZATION

Imagine the respective changes in market capitalizations of Microsoft and Pfizer if copyrights were abolished tomorrow. One of the
companies would likely be mortally wounded; the other might take little
notice. Take the same imaginary journey but conjure the vision of patents instead of copyrights being abolished. There would still be two very
different reactions, but the respective roles of the two companies would
be reversed.
A Pfizer, Merck, or a Wyeth, with or without a copyright law, is
largely the same enterprise. A Microsoft, an Oracle, or an Intuit might
cease to exist altogether without an effective copyright law. No one can
dispute, therefore, that there are "industry differences" that exist in terms
of the dependency on a well-functioning copyright law. Indeed, for some
companies, it is the principal driver of market capitalization; for others,
it is of no material economic consequence. The same is clearly true of
patent law.
This type of "industry difference," however, creates no inherently
different outlook on IP policy issues. Across industry groups, there is
active and unwavering support for a successful copyright system-and
active and unwavering support for a successful patent system.
What is true for a successful IP system is not necessarily equally true
for a failing IP system. Pfizer and Microsoft might well express "indus-
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try differences" if both faced a failing copyright system. If Pfizer, for
example, faced enormous potential liability in copyright litigation as a
result of being forced to defend against a multiplicity of questionable
copyright claims, it would have an incentive to devote significant efforts
to address the causes and effects of such a failing system.
In a failing copyright system of this type, Microsoft might not be as
eager an advocate for significant copyright law reform. It could likely
justify defending against scads of meritless copyright claims as a cost of
doing business because the cost to defend against these meritless claims
is trivial compared to the commercial benefits derived from its use of
copyright law.
A similar analysis is holds true for Microsoft and Pfizer with respect
to the patent system. A single patent can represent billions of dollars in
market capitalization for a research-based pharmaceutical company.26 A
multi-billion dollar medicine might be protected by a single issued U.S.
patent. For many pharmaceutical companies, a relatively small number
of such patents account for the bulk of their market capitalization.
In the IT community, a single device might be protected by dozens
to hundreds of patents,29 with the value of any individual patent being
limited to the relatively negligible cost of developing an alternative technology to avoid the patent. This reality is best described by Apple
Computer (184th on the IPO Top 300 Patent Owners of 2005 listing,
with 85 issued U.S. patents), describing patents as an important, but not
the primary, success factor for its business:
Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights and Licenses
The Company currently holds rights to patents and copyrights
relating to certain aspects of its computer systems, iPods, peripherals and software. In addition, the Company has registered,
and/or has applied to register, trademarks and service marks in
the U.S. and a number of foreign countries for "Apple," the Apple logo, "Macintosh," "iPod," "iTunes" "iTunes Music Store,"
and numerous other trademarks and service marks. Although the
Company believes the ownership of such patents, copyrights,
trademarks and service marks is an important factor in its business and that its success does depend in part on the ownership
26.
ELI LILLY AND Co., 2005 ANSWERS FOR SHAREHOLDERS 15 (2006) available at
http://www.lilly.com/investor/annual-report/lillyar2005.pdf.
27.
Id. (Zyprexa, an anti-psychotic medication, had approximately $4.2 billion in sales
in 2005). Zyprexa is covered by U.S. Patent No. 5,229,382.
28.
ELI LILLY AND Co., supra note 26, at 15.
29.
Wendy H. Schacht, Cong. Research Serv., Patent Reform: Innovation Issues 13
(July 15, 2005), available at http://tlc.usm.maine.edu/cli/documents/crs-report-patentreform.pdf.
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thereof, the Company relies primarily on the innovative skills,
technical competence, and marketing abilities of its personnel.o
Conversely, the typical 10-K for a pharmaceutical company identifies patents as material to the underlying business model, and reports on
patents and patent expiration dates that define the life and death of the
market for a branded medicine.3
The value of each patent means that when a major pharmaceutical
company is sued on a questionable patent-a "bad apple" in the patent
examination process-the costs of resolving the patent issue will be negligible compared to value of the company's patent portfolio. "Bad
apples," however annoying and distracting, do not make the patent system less of an overall net positive for the pharmaceutical company.
When a company like Apple faces a "bad apple" patent, it has no
multi-billion dollar offset from its patent-derived market capitalization.
One "bad apple" patent may appear to be more of a potential risk and
potential threat to the company than the value of any of its own individual patents, or even its entire patent portfolio covering one of its
products. Thus, IT companies are affected differently by a patent system
plagued with significant numbers of "bad apples," especially where significant obstacles exist to promptly eliminating the "bad apples" after
issuance. For these companies, the specter of bad apples by the basketful
drives a very extreme view of the cost-benefit of the U.S. patent system.
While "bad apples" bedevil all industry sectors, those industry sectors where patents form a material part of the market capitalization of
individual companies have a greater tolerance for mistakenly issued patents. In other industry sectors, bad apples, due to greater numbers and
greater relative impact, can overwhelm the value of the patent system as
a driver of innovation.
The pan-industry view that the burden of "bad apples" must be
eliminated through patent quality measures suggests that the "industry
difference" of relative impact is not an inherent difference in the operation of the patent system. This again circles the discussion back to the
National Academies' recommendations-make the needed "harmonizing" changes, eliminate "subjective elements," and establish an "open
review" procedure 32-all of which would address the existence and disposition of "bad apple" patents.

30.
Apple Computer, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 14-15 (September 4, 2005),
available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=107357&p=irol-sec (emphasis added).
31.
See generally ELI LILLY AND Co., supra note 26.
32.
See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 4, at 81-129.
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IV. THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF "BAD APPLE" PATENTS
HAS RESULTED IN A MISGUIDED FOCUS ON
DISABLING PATENT REMEDIES IN THE NAME OF

PATENT REFORM

Myths, believed and acted upon, do have consequences. Over the
past two years, it has become clear that loose talk about inherent and
inevitable "industry differences" in the operation of the patent system
has produced unnecessary and unproductive discord in the efforts at patent reform.33 The two coalitions have neither succeeded in bridging their
few remaining differences nor been able to sustain a constructive dialogue, especially one aimed at understanding and redressing root causes
of "industry differences." The reigning dysfunction can be seen in the
efforts to craft a very limited reform agenda targeted at patent remedies.34
These efforts are a calculated response to what is seen as the dire economic consequences of low-quality patents.
Industry sectors dependent upon patents as a source of significant
market capitalization have reacted to these "damages control" proposals
in the same manner as the software industry would respond to efforts to
diminish or disable sanctions for copyright infringements. Thus, in attacking patent remedies instead of the root causes of patent quality, these
misguided reform efforts conflict with the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and other industry sectors whose economic survival depend upon
adequate and effective remedies for patent infringement.
If patents, good and bad, give rise to inconsequential damages and
little in the way of injunctive relief for their owners, then adversely held
patents are hardly a threat to the economic viability of any business sector. The consequence of limiting any downside for a patent infringer is
the corresponding elimination of any upside for the owner of a wholly
valid patent. Without consequences for patent infringement, the patent
no longer provides any incentive for the patent owner to invest in the
patented invention.
More importantly, it produces a vicious cycle of degradation of the
patent system. If bad patents cannot produce bad consequences for infringers, where is the incentive to eliminate such patents? Who will
generate the political will to improve the operation of the USPTO and
stop such patents only from issuing? If limiting remedies inevitably
leads to a lesser focus on patent quality and greater numbers of questionable patents, then existent patents become less deserving of respect. For

33.

See supra note 29.

34.
The remedy reform efforts deal with the right to an injunction and damages adequate to fully compensate for the infringement of a valid patent.
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the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and other patent-dependent industries, this outcome is anathema.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the reform agenda for the patentdependent constituencies has been to seek reforms that will lead to a virtuous cycle of improving patent quality rather than a vicious cycle of
further undermining patent quality.35
The logic behind elevating patent quality to reduce "bad apples" is to
create a double upside. First, all companies will face fewer questionable
patents. Second, they will presumably own fewer patents and proportionately fewer questionable patents as improvements are made in
weeding out the "bad apples" early. A high quality patent system-with
a prompt and facile means of eliminating mistakenly issued patentsleaves patent-owning constituencies with more reliable and bankable
patent assets. Again, the criteriafor patent success and patent failure
know no industry differences.
Casting aside the myth of inevitable and consequential industry differences should, therefore, create a dialogue over balanced civil justice
reforms for all patent litigants and not just the defendant's agenda of
such reforms. The agenda can focus on the potential abuse of punitive
damage awards and the proportionality of compensatory damage awards,
rather than an agenda focused on efforts to diminish, dilute or destroy
patent remedies.
V. CASTING ASIDE THE "DIVERSITY MYTH" OPENS THE WAY TO
DEFINING THE COMMON AGENDA FOR PATENT REFORM THAT
JUSTIFIES PRESERVATION OF A UNITARY PATENT SYSTEM

The counter-thesis of this paper is clear, at least in part, because it is
just common sense: How should the U.S. patent system be remade to
align with the pan-industry success factors while mitigating the panindustry fail factors? In other words, if the myth of inherent and inevitable "industry differences" propelling movement to a non-unitary patent
system can be debunked, what reforms should address the interests of all
industry sectors?
This responsive agenda has already been largely developed. As mentioned above, it is found in the work of the National Research Council of
the National Academies following their four-year study of the U.S. patent system."

35.

Rochelle Dreyfuss, PathologicalPatenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH.

L. REV. 1559, 1562, 1572-73 (2006).
36.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note

4.
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The National Academies' recommendations were that Congress
should take up four key legislative initiatives:
*

Provide the USPTO with adequate resources to assure quality
examination of all patent applications.37

"

Limit "subjective elements" in patent litigation, i.e., the "inequitable conduct" defense to enforceability, punitive
damages based upon38 "willful infringement," and the "best
mode" requirement.,

*

Make harmonizing changes to the U.S. patent laws by adopting first-inventor-to-file principles and eliminating the "best
mode" requirement.39
Provide an "open review" (post-grant opposition) procedure
that facilitates challenging questionable patents in the
USPTO, e.g., create strong incentives to make use of a 9month window after a patent is issued to request a review of
the patent in which all questions of the validity of a patent
could be contested before a panel of administrative patent
judges in the USPTO, with the40right of appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Ancillary proposals to augment the effectiveness of these potential
changes have included mandating publication of all U.S. patent applications eighteen months after their original filing date,4 permitting pregrant submissions of prior art to patent examiners from members of the
public, 42 removing all other intent-based subjectivity from the patent
43
statute, and expanding the availability of so-called "prior user rights" to
all categories of patents.M

Such a reformed patent system will be characterized by the transparency, objectivity, simplicity, and certainty that is so uncharacteristic of
the existing patent system. The "gold standard" for advancing patent
quality could be realized for many, if not most, patents-an individual
with suitable training could pick up a patent or a published patent application, reference only publicly accessible information, and make a fuller
and more certain determination of patentability.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 103-108.
Id. at 117-123.
Id. at 123-127.
Id. at 95-103.
35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000).
Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 10 (2005).
Id. § 5.

44.

Id. § 9.
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Equally important, the 9-month post-grant opposition window 5
would assure that questionable patents could be promptly tested and
eliminated. This provides a compelling incentive for the public to make
use of the procedure given its inherent, challenger-friendly civil justice
implications. Those who opposing a patent within the 9-month window
can deny the patent applicant the choice of timing for defending the patent's validity, the forum for doing so, the opportunity for a trial by jury,
the judicial deference resulting from the presumption of validity of an
issued patent, and the "clear and convincing evidence" standard applied
to the challenger.
Implementing the National Academies' recommendations will result
in patent law principles in emerging areas of technology developing with
unprecedented speed. The compelling nature of the 9-month window for
encouraging early challenges to a patent's validity will mean that patent
oppositions in the United States will be at least as numerous as such proceedings are in Europe. Even if the rate of oppositions to newly issued
patents is in the low single digit percentage range-far lower than the
mid-single digit percentage in Europe4--the result will be thousands of
oppositions each year, hundreds of APJ decisions each year, and dozens
of Federal Circuit opinions on core patentability questions.
This process of rapid opposition and adjudication of core patentability issues will produce a positive feedback loop that will inform and
enrich the patent examination process. Fewer and better patents should
issue as patent examiners are better armed with administrative and judicial precedents defining what can and cannot be validity patented. This
type of jurisprudence becomes particularly valuable to the emerging areas of technology that are currently unguided by any substantial body of
such jurisprudence.
Maintaining a unitary patent system-with common patentability
rules that are applied to all areas of technology-generates additional
synergies from this effort at patent reform. Why? The synergies come
from the cross-pollination effect of patent jurisprudence. As one example, decisions applying the "written description" requirement, among the
most arcane of patent law, to one area of technology should inform the
application of such principles to other areas of technology. The result is
an accelerated development of patent law as it applies to emerging technologies. Over the past several decades "chemical" patent law has
undeniably accelerated the understanding of limits on patentability for

45.
Id.
46.
Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errorsand Why Administrative Patent Review
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943,966 (2004).
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biotechnology inventions, and the same is now needed in other areas
such as "business method" and software-driven computing machine patents.
CONCLUSION

Without question, the application of patentability criteria to emerging technology areas is unacceptably slow and the prolonged uncertainty
it creates bedevils these fields of technology. Comprehensive patent law
reforms are needed to make the patent system more transparent, objective, simple, and predictable, and to facilitate meaningful public
participation in the patenting process. Public participation in the patent
system via strong incentives for the public to make use of the 9-month
post-issuance window to challenge a patent's validity will, in turn, accelerate development of a deeper understanding of patentability
requirements as applied to every field of technology.
Such reform to the patent laws is root-cause focused. It entirely undercuts any notion that the patent remedies are a core problem because
questionable patents cannot be promptly and efficiently eliminated.
Questionable patents can and will be promptly addressed-either by patent examiners armed with better jurisprudence on what is patentable, or
by the public providing the examiners with all the information relevant
to a patent's validity.
Thus, the fundamental notion of inherent and inevitable "industry
differences" as a motive for patent reforms, largely geared towards dissembling a unitary patent system and disabling effective patent remedies,
is exposed as merely an artifact of a patent system in need of substantial,
but unitary, changes. Perhaps the next two-day conference on "industry
differences" will be entitled "Patents and Unitarianism-The Patent System After The National Academies' Reforms Have Redressed The
Flawed Contentions Of Inherent and Inevitable Industry Differences."

